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Recent technological advances in robotics and artificial 
intelligence (AI) have revitalized the belief that intelligent 
machines—machines that mimic or even exceed human cog-
nition abilities—could become a tangible reality in the very 
near future. This belief is reemerging despite the fact that the 
AI research community has established the boundaries of 
intelligent behavior within severely limiting conditions and 
situations and thus favors terms such as embodied cognition 
and situated cognition [1]. In this context, the gap between 
the expectations of what AI can offer and what is actually 
possible within the remit of reality is growing rapidly.
In this article, I discuss possibilities for development of 
intelligent machines from an artistic perspective by present-
ing three of my recent works. The first of these works is Flies 
(2013), which engages with one of the interpretations of con-
sciousness in AI and is inspired by the Searle-Dennett debate. 
The next work is EDNCFF (2013), which utilizes theories of 
socially situated AI, expressive-AI and human-centered de-
sign to propose an alternative approach for creating a com-
puter’s agency. And last is AI Prison (2014), which addresses 
why computers’ intentionality may be simply forbidden by 
the very nature of software and hardware commonly used 
in AI.
The use of AI techniques and tools is not a requirement 
for the development of the artworks because the core issues 
discussed are predominantly ontological rather than techni-
cal. In fact, no part of the software used for the development 
of the three works makes use of AI despite it being relevant 
to all three. The remaining sections of this article offer a dis-
cussion around the theory and praxis behind these works.
Flies: A CRITIquE of STRonG AI
In each of 16 squares on a computer screen, a smaller colored 
square moves randomly within it (Fig. 1). When the smaller 
square hits the border of the bigger square, the bigger square 
briefly blinks, turning red for a moment while also emitting a 
short buzzing sound. The buzzing sound represents a single 
firing neuron in a human’s brain. A sequence of firing neurons 
is produced by the buzzing of multiple squares in any given 
order and/or combination. In other words, the resulting series 
of buzzing sounds represents the sonification of a thought.
Flies is an audiovisual artwork that presents an interpre-
tation of the controversy around the idea of consciousness 
in computers, where consciousness is defined as “sense of 
selfhood, understanding and intentional acting on reality.” 
This definition closely relates to the concept of strong AI, 
and the artwork is inspired by the historical debate involv-
ing its meaning and implications as presented in the cor-
respondence between the philosophers John R. Searle and 
Daniel C. Dennett [2]. The definition of strong AI is presented 
by Searle as follows: “The appropriately programmed com-
puter really is a mind in the sense that computers given the 
right program can be literally said to understand and have 
other cognitive states” [3]. Thus, the correctly programmed 
computer would not simply simulate the way a mind works 
(defined as weak AI), but it would be a mind of its own and 
therefore be conscious. Searle believes that strong AI is not 
achievable because no evidence in neurological research 
demonstrates that consciousness originates from mechanical 
processes nor does the evidence indicate where in the brain 
consciousness might take place. Dennett has argued the op-
posite in his theory known as the “multiple drafts model of 
consciousness” (MDMC) [4]. His theory rejects the notion of 
a central place where consciousness occurs, and it describes 
mental states as a continuous flux of parallel information 
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processing that happens in many specialized places of the 
brain at diff erent times. Th e transition between unconscious-
ness and consciousness cannot be timed, and our mind is 
nothing beyond a chain of processes in our nervous system.
Flies engages with this debate by attempting to visualize the 
genesis of a thought by a computer. Th e eventual emergence 
of this thought is then speculatively interpreted as a sign of 
consciousness. Th e series of moving and, at times, buzzing 
squares stands as a metaphor for human neural activity. Th e 
simplicity of the coding algorithm that generates the graphics 
refl ects the opinion that if consciousness were to be gener-
ated by mechanical processes, consciousness would happen 
regardless of the complexity of the computational algorithms 
in use (e.g. AI). Th us, even the simplest of programs could be 
thought to be conscious (although to a very minimal degree). 
From this perspective, Flies is in line with Searle’s opinion 
because there is no way to establish objectively whether “the 
fi rst-person conscious feelings and experiences we all have” 
[5] are experienced by the program. Nevertheless, I do not 
discard Dennett’s idea of consciousness as a third-person 
phenomenon. Th e several buzzing sequences generated by 
the squares colliding with the borders of their delimiting 
spaces represent the sonifi cation of the computer’s thoughts. 
Th us, the computer talks but it does so in an unknown lan-
guage. When the computer talks, there is nothing prohibiting 
a member of an audience from thinking that the sonifi cation 
of the computer’s thoughts is a clear manifestation of the 
computer’s inner consciousness.
It is the evaluation of the role of the observer and its re-
lational dynamics with the computer that form the basis for 
the second artwork presented here.
eDNCFF: REVERSInG pERSpECTIVES
A computer monitor, disguised as an old TV, is placed in a 
public space (Fig. ). While playing semi-random videos from 
the Web to catch the attention of passersby, the computer looks 
continuously for all in-range Bluetooth devices (e.g. phones, 
tablets, laptops, etc.). When a device is found, the computer 
stops playing the videos and fl atters the found device with a 
love message that is spoken out loud via the internal computer 
speakers.
In 1968 Edward Ihnatowicz (1926–1988) publicly exhib-
ited the Sound-Activated Mobile (SAM), an analogic robotic 
sculpture able to move in the direction of noise created by 
a nearby audience [6]. Several digital artists have since de-
veloped similar structures investigating the human-machine 
relationship, some using traditional sensing and computer 
means. Others, such as Stelarc (1946– ) with his Articulated 
Head [7], have used sensing technology and sophisticated AI 
techniques to develop robots able to verbally communicate 
with humans.
Th e idea that artifi cial intelligence, rather than being imag-
ined as an intrinsic attribute of computers, manifests instead 
in the interaction between the machine and its environment 
is not new to AI. Interactionist AI theories such as Mateas’s 
culturally oriented approach to AI-based art (Expressive AI) 
[8] and Sengers’s idea of socially situated AI [9] have indeed 
highlighted the importance of agency, audience and author-
ship for the manifestation of intelligence in AI. In all cases, 
however, the dream for a real form of artifi cial intelligentia
is short lived. Th is is because, as pointed out by Moulthrop 
in relation to hypertext art, “Th e constantly repeated ritual 
of the interaction reveals the text [read dialogue] as a made 
thing, not monologic perhaps, but hardly indeterminate” 
[10]. Once the dream fades out, the system is better described 
in terms of human-centered design in which the computer 
is seen as a medium for the communication between two 
humans: the designer (i.e. artist) and the user (i.e. audience) 
[11]. On these premises, my work entitled Entertainment 
does not come for free . . . (EDNCFF) attempts to respond 
to the dream of nonhuman agency by speculatively revers-
ing the roles of the actors in the human-computer system. A 
computer-centered design, as opposed to a human-centered
one, informs the development of the system/artwork.
EDNCFF transforms the human (audience) into a tool al-
lowing communication between nonhuman agencies. Th e 
computer knows [12] that it can communicate with peers 
(other Bluetooth devices) only if these are within a specifi c 
range (ca. 8 meters). Th e computer also knows that humans 
carry Bluetooth devices with them most of the time. Some 
strategy needs to be put in place to get them in close prox-
imity. Th e computer, in a public space under false identity, 
fig. 1. Flies, hardware: Raspberry Pi, 
10.1-inch display; software: openFrame-
works, 23 × 15 × 0.6 cm. Exhibited at 
Limerick Lifelong Learning Festival 2013 
(Ireland): Faber Studio Limerick, 18–24 
March 2013. (© Giuseppe Torre)
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assumes that humans are drawn to funny videos on the basis 
that it has itself been previously used for that purpose for 
large amounts of time. Th is action is used as a hook to attract 
the attention of passersby and to get them close to the moni-
tor. If the computer is successful, and if the individual has the 
device’s Bluetooth settings on, the computer will broadcast 
to the in-range device by calling it by name and fl attering it 
with a love message.
Th e computer-centered design was developed around the 
following similarities and contrasts with its human-centered
counterpart:
• Language: In human-centered design, lines of code 
are used to emulate human language and behavior. 
Th is is because the audience is the recipient of the 
message sent from the author. In contrast, EDNCFF 
adopts human language (the fl attering love message) 
as a vehicle for enabling the computer-to-computer 
communication.
• Spatial Relationship: Th e movement and interac-
tions between the computer and audience are what 
have been described as the fuel for evoking agency. 
Th e designer is an invisible presence and can be 
thought of as remaining still. EDNCFF presents this 
relationship with roles reversed. Now it is the humans 
and the devices they carry that move around. Th e 
main computer remains still.
• Dialogue: In human-centered interactions the dia-
logue is generally implicit. Th is means that the com-
munication between the designer and an audience 
does not manifest directly because it is part of an 
implicit dialogic process. In the computer-centered 
interactions the communication between the two 
agents is, instead, explicit in that the computer 
addresses another device directly, although by 
means of pseudo-human language.
Considering the short amount of time a casual pass-
erby may spend in front of an old TV, EDNCFF consists of 
a 60-second loop overall. Th e loop is interrupted only if a 
Bluetooth device is found. Th en the title of the installation 
is displayed. It is at this moment that the passerby is invited 
to refl ect on what just happened. Th e entertainment (i.e. 
videos displayed), apparently free, comes at the cost of the 
audience’s personal data. Th e audience may fi nd this experi-
ence playful and fun, but the audience may also feel used. 
Bringing to mind ideas and fears from sci-fi  literature and 
cinematography, EDNCFF off ers a tangible, although brief 
and primordial, experience of how it feels to be used by a 
computer whose intent is to communicate with its peers 
rather than with humans.
THE AI pRISon
If the number “1” appears once in this endless stream of zeros 
(Fig. ), you better run fast and far. Th e computer has gone 
beyond the remits of what it was programmed to do. It can 
now decide for itself !
Will and intentionality are at the core of many Good Old 
Fashioned AI (GOFAI) artworks, such as Cohen’s AARON 
[13]. As for the interactionists who argue for the emergence of 
intelligence in the interaction between human and machine, 
they face similar problems. Th at is, as soon as we know that 
a computer is responsible for a given artistic outcome, we as-
sume that the outcome is just the result of a series of instruc-
tions. It does not matter how complicated these instructions 
are or how aware of these instructions we may be.
AI Prison engages with questions about the feasibility of 
artifi cial intentionality. Intentions are thought to be a con-
sequence of the ability of a system or organisms to inde-
pendently self-organize and self-evolve memory paths (i.e. 
neural system). AI Prison consists of 10 lines of C++ code 
(the most widely used language in AI) (Fig. 4). Th e code 
describes an infi nite loop that displays an undefi ned vari-
able “i” on to the console. In C++, failure to defi ne a vari-
able could make the result of a program unpredictable, and 
it is indeed good practice to always explicitly instantiate 
any variable declared (e.g. i=0). Th at is because when the 
fig. 2. EDNCFF, hardware: iMac; 
software: openFrameworks, Objective-
C, 51 × 65 × 40 cm. Exhibited at the 
Department of Computer Science and 
Information Systems of the University 
of Limerick (Ireland), 29 April 2013. 
(© Giuseppe Torre)
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program is executed each variable is allocated to a specifi c 
memory address. When one fails to defi ne a variable, one 
incurs the risk of the variable being assigned to a memory 
address that is already in use and whose content would be 
unknown.
However, even if one does not instantiate a variable, the 
possibility of having a random value assigned to the variable 
is extremely remote, if not nonexistent. Th is is because of a 
series of safety measures that, rarely controlled or control-
lable by programmers, are implemented at lower soft ware 
and hardware levels. First, when a program is executed, the 
operating system (OS) allocates a portion of its available 
memory to the program and erases/
zeroes it. Th is portion of memory is 
still handled at the soft ware level, and 
it is known as virtual memory (VM). 
Second, the allocated VM is program-
specifi c and cannot mix with virtual 
partitions created for other applica-
tions. Last, the virtual memory’s re-
quest from the OS is handled by the 
Memory Management Unit (MMU), 
which translates the VM’s request to 
the physical memory (i.e. the hard-
ware). Th ese safety procedures are 
standard in the vast majority of op-
erating systems and are the main rea-
son why the AI Prison program will 
always output “0.” Th us, imprisoned 
and guarded by the OS and MMU, the 
computer is unable to self-determine 
its memory confi guration. Deprived 
of indeterminacy and relegated to de-
terminacy, it is prevented from self-
evolving and, eventually, expressing 
intentionality.
ConCLuSIon
Th e ontological issues discussed with 
respect to the three artworks above 
pertain to the possibility of creating 
computers with intelligence compa-
rable to or exceeding that of humans. 
Assessments of these artworks lead 
to the conclusion that the creation 
of computers with this level of intel-
ligence is not possible. Th e artworks 
reaﬃ  rm views held by many AI re-
searchers for whom the limitations of 
the fi eld are well known.
I was driven to develop these art-
works in response to the mass media’s
increased interest in AI—an interest that has, in my opin-
ion, raised the general public’s expectations of AI excessively. 
While the combination of mass media and sci-fi  culture has 
led to a widening of the gap between expectations and reality 
for AI, I attempt to narrow this gap in my artworks by invit-
ing the audience to refl ect on the real possibilities of current 
AI technology and research. My intent is to help the viewer 
refl ect on the complexity of the present rather than imagin-
ing a remote future. Beyond the legitimate means for dream-
ing provided by sci-fi  culture, perhaps our faith in technology 
has made us focus almost exclusively on its possibilities and 
forget its limitations.
fig. 3. AI Prison, hardware: Raspberry Pi, 10.1-inch display; software: LXTerminal. 23 × 15 × 0.6 cm. 
BLITZ Contemporary Art Gallery’s permanent collection (Malta) 2014. (© Giuseppe Torre)
fig. 4. AI Prison, C++ code of the program. (© Giuseppe Torre)
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